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Abstract
In recent years, the attack which leverages register informa-
tion (e.g. accounts and passwords) leaked from 3rd party ap-
plications to try other applications is popular and serious.
We call this attack ”database collision”. Traditionally, people
have to keep dozens of accounts and passwords for different
applications to prevent this attack. In this paper, we propose
a novel encryption scheme for hiding users’ register informa-
tion and preventing this attack. Specifically, we first hash the
register information using existing safe hash function. Then
the hash string is hidden, instead a coefficient vector is stored
for verification. Coefficient vectors of the same register in-
formation are generated randomly for different applications.
Hence, the original information is hardly cracked by dictio-
nary based attack or database collision in practice. Using our
encryption scheme, each user only needs to keep one pass-
word for dozens of applications.
Introduction
In daily life, people have to sign up dozens of different appli-
cations, e.g. softwares and websites. When some application
is hacked, the leaked register information (e.g. accounts and
passwords) may be leveraged by hackers to try other appli-
cations. If the same account and password is used, it will be a
serious threat. We call this attack ”database collision”. This
attack is listed as Top 10 Security Risks for 2014 by ZD-
NET (Blue 2014). It is recommended that people should use
different accounts and passwords for different applications
to prevent this attack. However, this solution brings people
some troubles, especially, keeping many different passwords
is really a complex and annoying task for many people.
Most applications hash users’ passwords or other impor-
tant register information in order to avoid hackers’ lever-
age of these important information when their databases are
hacked. However, some methods such as the rainbow table
(Oechslin 2003) can efficiently crack password hashes. As
most hash functions are open, different applications store the
same hash string for the same input. This makes the dictio-
nary based attack to hash functions easier. In some applica-
tions, the salt is introduced to the hash functions for gen-
erating different hash strings. The fact that the salt is fixed
and the whole process is reversible makes this scheme not
secure.
Similar to Biometric Cryptosystems (Uludag et al. 2005)
(Zhou et al. 2016), we aim to protect the register information
from leaking. In this paper, we propose a novel encryption
scheme to hide users’ register information (illustrated in Fig.
1). Different from traditional schemes, we do not keep the
hash string of register information (e.g. password) directly.
Instead, we hide the hash string and keep a random coeffi-
cient vector for verification or encoding some key informa-
tion. Specifically, in the registration phase, we hash the reg-
ister information using existing safe hash function. Then we
repeat the hash process for several times and convert these
hash strings to big numbers. We concatenate these numbers
to form a vector which can be viewed as a datapoint in the
high-dimension space. We randomly generate some auxil-
iary datapoints in the space and guarantee that there exists
only one hyperplane covering all these datapoints. The coef-
ficient vector of the this hyperplane can be calculated using
these datapoints. We store the coefficient vector instead of
hash string for hiding original hash string. The hash hiding
process is illustrated in Fig. 2. Some key information can be
encoded in this hyperplane equation by setting the constant
term. In the verification phase, the datapoint of the testing
input is obtained using the aforementioned process. If the
testing input is the same to register information, the testing
datapoint locates on the hyperplane and the verification suc-
ceeds. Otherwise, the verification fails and the encoded in-
formation is not accessible. In our scheme, several pieces of
different register information can be registered for separate
use at the same time.
This paper has two main contributions: i) a novel encryp-
tion scheme is proposed, which is hardly cracked by dictio-
nary based attack or database collision. ii) with our scheme,
every user only needs to keep one register information (e.g.
password) for all applications.
Proposed Method
Registration
In the registration process, one or several pieces of user’s
register information are used to generate random coeffi-
cient vectors. p denotes a piece of register information
which is a string. The string is first hashed using a safe
hash function (e.g. SHA-256 (Gilbert and Handschuh 2003))
h = H(p). h is a fixed-length string with the length l.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed encryption scheme.
We repeat the hash process for d times and obtain a set
of strings {h1, h2, ..., hd}. Then these strings are converted
to big numbers for obtaining a d-dim row vector v1 =
(x1, x2, ..., xd). If several pieces of register information are
provided, we obtain several vectors {v1,v2, ...,vn}, where
n is the number of register strings and n < d.
Next, we randomly generate d− n auxiliary vectors (e.g.
auxiliary datapoints) with the same dimensionality and span,
namely, {vn+1,vn+2, ...,vd}. We guarantee that the deter-
minant of the square matrix V = (v1;v2; ...;vd) which is
formed by these d datapoints does not equal zero, so that
these d datapoints can span the only one d − 1-dim hyper-
plane in the d-dim ambient space. We denote the hyperplane
using the following linear equation,
α1x1 + ...+ αdxd = c. (1)
Hence, we can calculate the coefficients of the hyperplane
function using these d datapoints. It can be easily solved
by calculating the inverse matrix, i.e. α = V −1c. c =
(c; c; ...; c) and α = (α1;α2; ...;αd) are two d-dim column
vectors. The number c can be simply set to be 1 for verifi-
cation. For encoding key string s, we can convert s to c. In
our scheme, each application stores the randomly generated
coefficient vector α.
Verification
Considering the testing input pˆ, we first calculate the testing
datapoint vˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, ..., xˆd) using aforementioned pro-
cess. The testing number cˆ is calculated by the dot product
of coefficients and the testing datapoint, i.e. cˆ = αvˆ. If the
datapoint vˆ satisfies the hyperplane equation 1, cˆ = c and
”True” is returned. Otherwise, ”False” is returned. In addi-
tion, for decoding purpose, the key string s is obtained by
decoding cˆ.
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Figure 2: Illustration of hash hiding process. For simplifica-
tion, we illustrate the hiding process in a 3-dim space. Given
the authentic datapoint and two random datapoints, a plane
equation can be calculated for one application. We store co-
efficients of the plane equation, while the authentic datapoint
is hidden. The intersection of two different planes (database
collision) can shrink the range which contains the authentic
datapoint (shown as the green line in the figure). We increase
the dimension and guarantee the dimension is greater than
the number of registered applications.
Security Analysis
Brute Force Attack
There are two possible ways to implement brute force attack.
First, all possible input strings are tried. In this way, the se-
curity of our scheme is guaranteed by the hash function and
the length of user’s register information. In our scheme, we
use existing safe hash functions. In addition, if each user
only needs to remember one password, he/she can keep one
long password. Hence, it will be more difficult to implement
this type of brute force attack to our encryption scheme.
Second, someone may try all possible datapoints in the
ambient space. Although many fake keys (those datapoints
located on the hyperplane) to our scheme are generated, the
whole space is also exponentially expanded. For simplifica-
tion, we assume that the hash string includes l hex charac-
ters, where l ≥ 128. Hence, the value range of each dimen-
sion xi is [0, 16l−1]. As the ambient space is one dimension
higher than the hyperplane, we can guess the intersection
point (i.e. an 1-dim variable) of the hyperplane and an arbi-
trary axis. The possibility of a successful guess that satisfies
the hyperplane equation is 1
16l
, where l ≥ 128. This possi-
bility is extremely low.
Dictionary based Attack
Our encryption scheme is hardly cracked by dictionary
based attack. The requirements of dictionary based attack in-
clude 1) the hash process is kept the same, 2) the data pair of
original input and corresponding hash string are known. In
our scheme, the coefficient vectors are generated randomly
every time and different applications store different coeffi-
cient vectors. The hash string of user’s register information
is not accessible even the database is cracked. Therefore, the
recording of leaked coefficient vectors is meaningless and
the dictionary attack is not a threat.
Database Collision
Compared to existing hash based encryption schemes, our
method is highly resistant to database collision. For each ap-
plication, a new hyperplane is randomly generated. When
a database is hacked and coefficient vectors are leaked, the
risk is that one dimension will be associated to others and
the range that contains authentic datapoint shrinks. In other
words, if two hyperplanes intersect, the free dimension of
points on the intersection will reduce by 1-dim (illustrated in
Fig. 2). The authentic datapoint must be on the intersection,
so the search range shrinks. Only if at least d hyperplanes
intersect, i.e. d different applications that contain the same
register information are hacked, the original hash string h
of user’s register information can be discovered. For pre-
venting this attack, we can simply increase d. For example,
if d > 100, it is enough to guarantee the security of most
users’ register information.
Experiments
We implement our method in Python and release the code
on Github1. In our experiment, d is set to be 100, and SHA-
1 https://github.com/PatrickZH/One-Password
256 is used as the hash function. Experiments show that our
method can effectively register and verify user’s informa-
tion.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel encryption scheme is proposed to pre-
vent the attack of database collision. We store coefficient
vectors which is randomly generated, instead of keeping
original hash string of register information. Hence, the dic-
tionary based attack and database collision can be effectively
prevented. Using our scheme, every user only needs to keep
one register information (e.g. one account and password) for
all applications.
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